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HARD CASES MAKE BAD LAW: EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
ABSTRACT 
The Constitution’s extraterritorial scope does not arise often in litigation. 
Two recent decisions broached the issue. Both arrived at opposite conclusions. 
And these decisions share a common thread: They confuse more than they clarify 
while begetting novel questions of law. Does the Constitution protect noncitizens 
abroad? If so, how? If not, why not? This Note addresses each of these questions 
in turn. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Constitution does not have any 
extraterritorial application whatsoever to noncitizens abroad. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  Today, courts are conflicted about the Constitution’s application to 
noncitizens in extraterritorial disputes.1 Although the Supreme Court has made 
 
 1  Compare Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment protects noncitizens who lack any substantial ties to the United States), petition for 
2
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clear that “certain constitutional protections” do not reach noncitizens abroad,2 it 
has not (recently) held that constitutional protections are wholly unavailable.3 
This judicial indecisiveness—though seemingly innocuous—proved immensely 
consequential in two recent cases.4 
In Hernandez v. Mesa,5 the Fifth Circuit tacitly held that a noncitizen 
who resides abroad cannot claim Fourth Amendment protection.6 Soon after, the 
Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Rodriguez v. Swartz.7 
Surprisingly, these courts arrived at their conflicting conclusions based upon 
indistinguishable facts: Both cases involved tragic cross-border shootings where 
Border Patrol agents (on U.S. soil) killed Mexican nationals (on Mexican soil). 
Since Hernandez and Rodriguez both involved “Mexican citizen[s] with 
no ties to [the United States], . . . the very existence of any ‘constitutional’ right 
 
cert. pending, No. 18-309, with Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) 
(holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a noncitizen who lacks any substantial ties 
to the United States), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019). The Solicitor General filed briefs in 
both cases. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Swartz v. Rodriguez, 139 S. Ct. 445 
(2018); Hernandez v. Mesa, 139 S. Ct. 306 (U.S. Apr. 11, 2019) (No. 17-1678), 2019 WL 1579640. 
 2  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
 3  See, e.g., Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 817 (noting the lack of “direct judicial guidance 
concerning the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution and its potential application to foreign 
citizens on foreign soil”). But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) 
(“The question presented . . . is whether the Fourth Amendment applies to . . . a nonresident 
alien . . . in a foreign country. We hold that it does not.”); United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 
F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2015) (“For Fourth Amendment rights to attach, the alien must show 
‘substantial connections’ with the United States.”); United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 268 
(C.A.A.F. 2012) (“Ultimately, we are unwilling to extend constitutional protections granted by the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to a noncitizen who is neither present within the sovereign territory 
of the United States nor established any substantial connections to the United States.”); Kiyemba 
v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he due process clause does not apply to 
aliens without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States.”); Atamirzayeva 
v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has long taken the 
view that the Constitution is subject to territorial limitations.”); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. 
Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 168 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment affords no 
protection to aliens searched by U.S. officials outside of our borders.”); United States v. Bravo, 
489 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not apply to activities of the United 
States against aliens in international waters.”). 
 4  Compare Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 752–53 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“[N]o court has previously 
extended Bivens to cases involving either the extraterritorial application of constitutional 
protections or in the national security domain, let alone a case implicating both.” (citations 
omitted)), with Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 817 (“There has been no direct judicial guidance 
concerning the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution and its potential application to foreign 
citizens on foreign soil.”). 
 5  885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 6  Id. at 817. 
 7  899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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benefitting [them] raises novel and disputed issues.”8 And from these cases, a legal 
paradox arose: “[A]n alien injured on Mexican soil by a Border Patrol agent 
shooting from Texas lacks recourse . . . [while] an alien injured . . . by an agent 
shooting from California or Arizona may sue for damages.”9 
To resolve the paradox—and to prevent similar ones from arising— this 
Note takes aim at its sole precondition: judicial uncertainty about the 
Constitution’s extraterritorial scope.10 This Note contends that the Constitution 
has no extraterritorial application whatsoever to noncitizens residing abroad 
(save for rare and peculiar circumstances11). This position finds its support in 
constitutional text, history, and law.12 Indeed, the position is implicit in the very 
word constitution.13 
At the outset, however, it is important to distinguish between what this 
Note is and what it is not. This Note is descriptive, not prescriptive. It describes 
what the law is and makes no prescriptive claims about what the law should be. 
This Note intends to resolve a disputed legal issue by relying on precedent—not 
by proposing new law. 
That said, this Note is not entirely devoid of prescription. It echoes 
William Blackstone’s view14 that courts must apply the law (defects and all).15 
As such, courts should not supplant inadequate law with more inadequate law. 
Nor should they distort existing law to reach conclusions they deem desirable. 
The judiciary does not pronounce new law; it maintains and expounds the old.16 
This restraint incentivizes legislative action that fosters meaningful change. And 
those who write the laws—not those who interpret them—tend to be better 
equipped to make policy decisions.17 
This Note proceeds in three parts. First, Part II provides an overview of 
the competing perspectives in constitutional extraterritoriality.18 Second, Part III 
 
 8  Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 817. 
 9  Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 758 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 10  Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 817 (noting the lack of “direct judicial guidance concerning the 
extraterritorial scope of the Constitution and its potential application to foreign citizens on foreign 
soil”). 
 11  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 724 (2008) (holding that the Suspension Clause had 
full legal force at Guantanamo Bay because the United States was the area’s de jure sovereign). 
 12  See infra Section III.B. 
 13  See infra Section IV.B.1.i. 
 14  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69. 
 15  See infra Part III. 
 16  1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14. 
 17  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 
(1983)). 
 18  See infra Section II.A (describing the Traditional Perspective of constitutional 
extraterritoriality); infra Section II.B (describing the Contemporary Perspective of constitutional 
extraterritoriality). 
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traces the origins of the Hernandez–Rodriguez paradox. Finally, Part IV explains 
why the Court must reaffirm Traditional-Perspective precedent to resolve the 
Hernandez–Rodriguez paradox. 
Because “[a]ny one setting out to dispute anything ought . . . to begin by 
saying what he does not dispute,”19 a disclaimer seems justified: This Note’s only 
concern is the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution; this Note does not 
dispute that noncitizens residing in the United States have constitutional rights. 
II. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF A NATIONAL DOCUMENT 
Historically, neither courts nor commentators gave much thought to the 
Constitution’s extraterritorial scope.20 Today, opinions on the subject abound.21 
Yet consensus dictates that noncitizens’ constitutional rights have traditionally 
stopped at the borders.22 And in the realm of constitutional extraterritoriality, the 
devil is not in the detail. The entire debate boils down to a single question: Does 
the Constitution apply to noncitizens abroad? 
To answer this question, this Part posits two views of constitutional 
extraterritoriality.23 One perspective (the “Traditional Perspective”) maintains 
that the Constitution has no extraterritorial application to noncitizens abroad; the 
other perspective (the “Contemporary Perspective”) relies upon the facts of 
particular cases to determine whether the Constitution should apply.24 Although 
these respective labels—“Traditional” and “Contemporary”—carry temporal 
 
 19  G.K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 3 (Image Books 1959) (1908). 
 20  The Supreme Court did not even consider the issue until 1891. See Ross v. McIntyre (In re 
Ross), 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891) (rejecting the petitioner’s contention that “the same protection 
and guaranty against an undue accusation or an unfair trial secured by the constitution to citizens 
of the United States at home should be enjoyed by them abroad”). And subsequent decisions 
remarked on how infrequently the topic arose. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 
(1950) (“Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so significant an 
innovation in the practice of governments that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have 
failed to excite contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No decision of this Court 
supports such a view. None of the learned commentators on our Constitution has even hinted at it. 
The practice of every modern government is opposed to it.” (citations omitted)). 
 21  See, e.g., Shawn E. Fields, From Guantánamo to Syria: The Extraterritorial Constitution in 
the Age of “Extreme Vetting”, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1123, 1151 (2018); Earl M. Maltz, The 
Constitution and the Trump Travel Ban, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 391 (2018); Jules Lobel, 
Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 
307 (2011). 
 22  Nathan S. Chapman, Due Process Abroad, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 377, 380–81 (2017). 
 23  See infra Section II.A (outlining the Traditional Perspective); infra Section II.B (outlining 
the Contemporary Perspective). 
 24  See infra Section II.A; infra Section II.B. 
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connotations, neither should be understood to reference a specific time period: 
Courts actively express both views today.25 
Below, Section II.A examines the Traditional Perspective. This view 
holds that the Constitution does not apply to noncitizens abroad.26 Section II.B 
explores the Contemporary Perspective. This view maintains that courts should 
undertake case-by-case analyses when determining the scope of constitutional 
extraterritoriality.27 And Section II.C discusses cases that unsuccessfully sought 
to reconcile the Traditional and Contemporary perspectives. 
A. The Traditional Perspective 
Ever since nation-states arose, they “have avoided subjecting people to 
conflicting laws (and disrupting one another’s legal systems) by international 
consensus that a nation’s law governs action within its territorial jurisdiction.”28 
Although countries may enact extraterritorial legislation,29 it “is the exception 
rather than the rule.”30 Therefore, courts generally presume that statutes do not 
apply extraterritorially.31 
Likewise, in the constitutional arena, the Traditional Perspective holds 
that “‘the protection of noncitizens under the Constitution . . . [stops] at the 
 
 25  Compare Castro v. Cabrera, 742 F.3d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 2014) (exemplifying the Traditional 
Perspective) (finding that the Fourth Amendment “does not apply to the search and seizure of 
nonresident aliens on foreign soil”), with Bayo v. Chertoff, 535 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(exemplifying the Contemporary Perspective) (relying upon Boumediene to permit limited 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution), reh’g granted sub nom. Bayo v. Napolitano, 593 
F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 26  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The plaintiffs 
cannot raise any other First Amendment claim, since the alleged religious discrimination in this 
case was directed at aliens abroad.” (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 
(1990))). 
 27  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 28  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 268 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 29  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1987)) (“[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . 
conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.”). 
 30  Id. 
 31  See, e.g., WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 (2018) 
(“Courts presume that federal statutes ‘apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.’”); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“When a statute gives no 
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”); Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 
185, 195 (1918) (“Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the 
law-making power has jurisdiction.”); Pope v. Nickerson, 19 F. Cas. 1022, 1026 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1844) (“The general rule . . . is, ‘Statuta suis clauduntur territoriis, nec ultra territorium 
disperantur.’”). 
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border,’ even with respect to the acts of state officials that operate abroad.”32 And 
this perspective—which sees constitutional rights as strictly territorial—
“prevailed as dogma for most of American constitutional history . . . [so] courts 
rarely saw any need to justify it.”33 
1. Tracing the Traditional Perspective’s Lineage 
In “the first great constitutional case”34—Chisholm v. Georgia35—Chief 
Justice John Jay recognized that “[e]very State Constitution is a compact made 
by and between the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner; 
and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the 
people of the United States to govern themselves . . . in a certain manner.”36 
This conception of the Constitution—“the social compact theory”37—
plays a pivotal role in the Traditional Perspective of extraterritoriality. If the 
Constitution is a compact between the people of the United States and their 
government38—as Chief Justice John Jay claims—the argument against its 
extraterritorial application to noncitizens abroad becomes self-evident: Those 
 
 32  Eyal Benvenisti & Mila Versteeg, The External Dimensions of Constitutions, 57 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 515, 530 (2018); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution 
Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 229 (2010) (“Traditional doctrines regarding the geographic 
scope of U.S. constitutional protections derive from nineteenth-century international law principles 
of jurisdiction, which largely limited the lawful jurisdiction of a sovereign state to its geographic 
territory.”). 
 33  GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 7 (1996). 
 34  Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1730 (2007). 
 35  2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
 36  Id. at 471 (emphasis added). 
 37  Fields, supra note 21, at 1149 (“[S]upporters of the social compact theory [believe] that the 
Constitution represents a voluntary contract between a government and its people . . . .”). 
 38  See, e.g., C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365, 372–73 
(1899) (“[T]here is a very strong presumption that when a constitution is made by a sovereign 
people, it is made exclusively for the country inhabited by that people, and exclusively for that 
people regarded as a body politic . . . . [T]he same thing is true, mutatis mutandis, of a constitution 
made by the people of several sovereign States united together for that purpose. The [United States 
Constitution’s] preamble, however, does not leave it to presumption to determine for what regions 
of country and what people the Constitution of the United States was made; for it expressly declares 
that its purposes and objects are, first, to form a more perfect union . . . . [And] to secure the 
blessings of liberty to the people by whom it is ordained and established, and their successors . . . . 
According to the preamble, therefore, the Constitution is limited to . . . States [that] have been 
admitted upon an equal footing with the original thirteen.”). 
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who are not party to a compact (viz., noncitizens abroad) cannot reap benefits 
therefrom.39 
i. The Court Embraces the Traditional Perspective 
Although the Traditional Perspective’s rudiments trace to 1793,40 the 
Court did not expressly embrace the view until its 1891 decision in In re Ross.41 
The case concerned a sailor who was convicted of murder after slitting a man’s 
throat on an American ship docked in Yokohama, Japan.42 After his conviction, 
the sailor sought a writ of habeas corpus because he had been denied a trial by 
jury.43 The Supreme Court held that “[t]he [C]onstitution can have no operation 
in another country.”44 In an opinion by Justice Field, the Court explained that 
“the [C]onstitution . . . ordained and established [a government] ‘for the United 
States of America,’ . . . not for countries outside [its] limits.”45 
Notably, a contemporaneous case established that “aliens residing in the 
United States . . . are entitled, so long as they are permitted by the government 
of the United States to remain in the country, to the safeguards of the 
[C]onstitution, and to the protection of the laws.”46 
 
 39  J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 
463, 504–05 (2007) (“Given the strong influence of the social compact theory of constitutional 
government on many Founders, it is not surprising that some Americans, particularly Federalists, 
disputed that aliens, even those within the United States, were protected by the most important 
municipal law, the Constitution, because aliens were not parties to the Constitution’s social 
compact.”). 
 40  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 473. 
 41  140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). 
 42  Id. at 454–57. 
 43  Id. at 458. 
 44  Id. at 464. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The fourteenth amendment to the constitution is not confined to the 
protection of citizens.”). 
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ii. Traditional Perspective Jurisprudence Comes to the 
Fore 
After In re Ross, cases exalting the Traditional Perspective abounded.47 
For instance, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.48 held that “[n]either 
the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign 
territory unless in respect of our own citizens.”49 And in the Insular Cases,50 the 
Court developed a doctrine of extraterritoriality that rendered constitutional 
protections contingent upon territorial incorporation.51 It extended protections to 
territories designated to become states and withheld protections from territories 
that were not.52 
Additionally, United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams53 made clear that 
a noncitizen does not become one of “the people” to whom the Constitution 
applies simply by attempting to enter the country.54 The Court emphasized that 
“[t]o appeal to the Constitution is to concede that this is a land governed by that 
supreme law, and . . . those who are excluded cannot assert the rights . . . 
obtaining in a land to which they do not belong as citizens or otherwise.”55 While 
 
 47  See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (holding that 
noncitizens receive constitutional protections only after entering the U.S. and developing 
substantial connections thereto); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) (holding that 
the Fifth Amendment has no extraterritorial application to noncitizens); United States v.Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (holding that the Constitution has no force or effect in 
foreign territories except with respect to U.S. citizens). 
 48  299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 49  Id. at 318. 
 50  Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Porto Rico v. Tapia, 245 U.S. 639 (1918); 
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Porto Rico v. Rosaly, 227 U.S. 270 (1913); Dowdell 
v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Dorr v. 
United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Fourteen Diamond 
Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Armstrong 
v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); De Lima v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). 
 51 “A vital distinction was made between ‘incorporated’ and ‘unincorporated’ territories.” 
Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 5 (1955). In the former, the Constitution fully 
applied. Id. In the latter, certain provisions applied if they were deemed essential. Id. “By 1922[,] 
it was regarded as clearly settled that the jury provisions of Article III and the Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments ‘do not apply to territory . . . which has not been incorporated into the Union.’” 
Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 475 (1956). See, e.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. at 304 (holding that the 
Sixth Amendment does not apply in Puerto Rico); Ocampo, 234 U.S. at 98 (holding that grand-
jury indictments are not necessary in the Philippines); Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148–50 (holding that jury 
trials are not required in the Philippines). 
 52  Kent, supra note 39, at 540 (citing Balzac, 258 U.S. at 304–06). 
 53  194 U.S. 279 (1904). 
 54  Id. at 292. 
 55  Id. 
9
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Ross’s sway eventually faltered,56 the Traditional Perspective’s ascent had only 
begun.57 
2. The Traditional Perspective’s Apogee 
In Johnson v. Eisentrager,58 the Supreme Court emphatically rejected 
the notion that “the Fifth Amendment confers rights upon all persons, whatever 
their nationality, wherever they are located and whatever their offenses.”59 
Instead, the Court held that noncitizens outside the geographic boundaries of the 
United States were not entitled to Fifth Amendment protections.60 
To preface its holding, the Court explained that the Constitution is not a 
safeguard for noncitizens residing abroad: “[I]n extending constitutional 
protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it 
was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary 
power to act.”61 And Eisentrager concluded with a succinct yet pronounced 
statement of skepticism: 
Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been 
so significant an innovation in the practice of governments that, 
if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to 
excite contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No 
decision of this Court supports such a view. None of the learned 
commentators on our Constitution has even hinted at it. The 
practice of every modern government is opposed to it.62 
From this precedential wellspring, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez63 
emerged. There, the Court held that “aliens receive constitutional protections 
when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed 
substantial connections with this country.”64 The case not only uprooted the 
 
 56  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957) (holding that the Constitution protects United States 
citizens abroad) (stating that “the Ross case should be left as a relic from a different era” without 
overruling it). 
 57  See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937) (recognizing that “our 
Constitution, laws, and policies have no extraterritorial operation, unless in respect of our own 
citizens”). 
 58  339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 59  Id. at 783. 
 60  Id. at 785 (“We hold that the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an 
immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service 
of a government at war with the United States.”). 
 61  Id. at 771. 
 62  Id. at 784–85 (citation omitted). 
 63  494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 64  Id. at 271. 
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budding seeds of Contemporary jurisprudence but also constituted the Court’s 
“most thorough exegesis on the extraterritorial application of constitutional 
provisions.”65 The case’s background and the court’s rationale follow. 
In 1985, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) 
suspected Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez of leading a drug-trafficking cartel.66 
A year later, the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (“MFJP”) arrested Verdugo-
Urquidez and transported him across the border into United States custody.67  
Meanwhile, the DEA sought authorization from the MFJP to search two 
of Verdugo-Urquidez’s residences in Mexico.68 The DEA believed that these 
searches would turn up evidence implicating Verdugo-Urquidez in a murder.69 
After receiving authorization, DEA agents—accompanied by MFJP officers—
searched the properties and seized documents.70 The search uncovered a tally 
sheet that cataloged Verdugo-Urquidez’s illicit drug shipments.71 
Before trial, Verdugo-Urquidez moved to suppress the evidence.72 He 
contended that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the 
DEA failed to obtain an American search warrant.73 The district court agreed.74 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.75 And the Supreme Court granted certiorari.76 
In its opinion, the Court begins by stating the issue: “whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to the search and seizure . . . of property that is owned by a 
nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.”77 A brief answer follows: 
“[I]t does not.”78 But a threefold rationale makes clear what a three-word answer 
cannot. 
First, the Court explains that “the people” is a constitutional term of art.79 
The precise phrase appears seven times in the Constitution.80 Given this notable 
 
 65  Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 834 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 66  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990). 
 67  Id. at 293 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. at 262 (majority opinion). 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 262–63. 
 72  Id. at 263. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. at 264. 
 77  Id. at 261. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. at 265. 
 80  Id. The Preamble was ordained and established by “the People of the United States.” U.S. 
CONST. pmbl. Article I makes “the People of the several States” responsible for choosing members 
of the House of Representatives. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. The First Amendment protects “the right of 
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infrequency—among other things—the Court concludes that “the people” only 
encompasses (1) citizens and (2) persons who develop a sufficient connection 
with the United States to be considered part of the national community.81 
Second, the Court looks to the relevant history. The historical evidence 
demonstrates that the framers were concerned with searches and seizures arising 
in domestic matters.82 The Fourth Amendment protects “the people of the United 
States against . . . action by their own Government; it was never . . . [understood] 
to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the 
United States territory.”83 
Third, the Court turns to case law. Drawing from precedent, the Court 
devises a simple, elegant method for determining constitutional applicability: 
“[A]liens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the 
territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this 
country.”84 Since Verdugo-Urquidez had no connection to the United States—
other than illegal drug trafficking—he could not rely on the Fourth Amendment 
for protection.85 
3. Recent Affirmations of the Traditional Perspective 
Recent cases demonstrate that the Traditional Perspective still holds 
sway with the Supreme Court. For instance, Zadvydas v. Davis86 reaffirmed the 
holdings of Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez: “It is well established that 
certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are 
unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders.”87 As in prior cases, the 
Court’s reasoning “rested upon a basic territorial distinction.”88 
In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,89 the Court explained that 
“[a]lthough the foreign client might not have a viable Fourth Amendment claim, 
it is possible that the monitoring of the target’s conversations with his or her 
attorney would provide grounds for a claim of standing on the part of the 
 
the people peaceably to assemble.” Id. amend. I. The Second Amendment protects “the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms.” Id. amend. II. The Ninth Amendment explains that the enumeration 
of certain rights shall not be construed to “deny or disparage others retained by the people.” Id. 
amend. IX. And the Tenth Amendment reserves the powers not delegated to the United States for 
“the people.” Id. amend. X. 
 81  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
 82  Id. at 266. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. at 271. 
 85  Id. at 271–73. 
 86  533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 87  Id. at 693. 
 88  Id. at 694 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953)). 
 89  568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
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attorney.”90 Likewise, in Kerry v. Din,91 a United States citizen brought suit on 
behalf of her noncitizen husband because “an unadmitted and nonresident alien 
. . . has no right of entry into the United States, and no cause of action to press in 
furtherance of [a constitutional claim].”92 
Last term, in Trump v. Hawaii,93 Justice Thomas echoed the Traditional 
Perspective’s mantra in his concurrence.94 He concluded that the plaintiffs did 
not present a viable First Amendment claim because “the alleged religious 
discrimination . . . was directed at aliens abroad.”95 
B. The Contemporary Departure from the Traditional Perspective 
Dissatisfied with the outcomes that the Traditional Perspective yields, 
some advocate an approach to constitutional extraterritoriality that “seeks to 
weigh the nature of the constitutional power to be applied, the relationship 
between the United States and the person seeking protection, the risk of injustice, 
and the practical limitations.”96 Many commentators contend that the Supreme 
Court recently adopted such an approach.97 
1. Boumediene v. Bush 
In Boumediene v. Bush,98 the Court held that the Suspension Clause99 
had full legal force and effect at Guantanamo Bay.100 There, several noncitizen 
Guantanamo Bay detainees—who were classified as enemy combatants—were 
 
 90  Id. at 421 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261). 
 91  135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). 
 92  Id. at 2131. 
 93  138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 94  Id. at 2424. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Richard Nicholson, Note, Functionalism’s Military Necessity Problem: Extraterritorial Habeas 
Corpus, Justice Kennedy, Boumediene v. Bush, and Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1393, 
1405 (2012) (citing José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1660, 1698 (2009)). 
 97  See, e.g., id. (finding that Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), adopts this approach); 
E. Carlisle Overbey, Note, Bringing Comfort to the Enemy?: The Past, Present, and Future of 
Habeas Corpus Petitions in Light of the Formalistic Application of Boumediene, 46 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 401, 425 (2013) (concluding that courts undermine Boumediene by applying it formalistically). 
 98  553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 99  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
 100  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
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denied writs of habeas corpus under Section 7(a) of the Military Commissions 
Act (“MCA”), which stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over such cases.101 
On appeal, the detainees challenged the MCA’s constitutionality.102 But 
the D.C. Circuit held that the provision in question was not an unconstitutional 
suspension of habeas corpus because noncitizens detained by the United States 
in foreign territories do not have a constitutional right of habeas corpus.103 Citing 
Johnson v. Eisentrager104 and relying upon historical evidence, the court 
concluded that habeas corpus is not “available . . . to aliens without presence or 
property within the United States.”105 The detainees appealed.106 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.107 In an opinion authored by 
Justice Kennedy, the Court held that Section 7(a) unconstitutionally suspended 
the writ of habeas corpus.108 Looking to Eisentrager for support, the Court 
identified three factors for determining Suspension Clause’s reach: “(1) the 
citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through 
which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where 
apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles 
inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”109 In so holding, the 
Court openly acknowledged that its decision was an aberration: “It is true that 
before today the Court has never held that noncitizens detained . . . in territory 
over which another country maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under 
our Constitution.”110 
i. Justice Souter Concurs 
Justice Souter concurred.111 He wrote separately to voice disagreement 
with the dissenters.112 First, Justice Souter argued that the Majority’s opinion was 
just a logical extension of Rasul v. Bush.113 “[I]t is no bolt out of the blue,” he 
 
 101  Id. at 732. 
 102  Id. at 733. 
 103  Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 987–91 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 104  339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that German prisoners of war detained in a United States run 
prison in Germany were not entitled to habeas corpus). 
 105  Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990. 
 106  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733. 
 107  Id. at 734. 
 108  Id. at 795. 
 109  Id. at 766. 
 110  Id. at 770. 
 111  Id. at 798 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. at 799 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)). 
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wrote.114 Second, he believed that the dissenters did not give sufficient weight to 
the length of time that the petitioners had been detained. Accordingly, he took 
issue with the suggestion “that the Court [was] . . . reviewing claims that the 
military . . . could handle within some reasonable period of time.”115 
ii. Chief Justice Roberts Dissents 
Chief Justice Roberts dissented.116 He suggested that the majority had 
supplanted federal law with “shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts 
at some future date.”117 Procedural concerns aside, the Chief Justice next 
assessed the substantive result.118  
“So who has won?” 119 he asked. It was not the detainees: They were left 
with “only the prospect of further litigation to determine the content of their new 
habeas right.”120 It was not Congress: “whose attempt to . . . balance the security 
of the American people with the detainees’ liberty interests [is] brushed aside.”121 
It was not the writ of habeas corpus: “whose majesty is hardly enhanced by its 
extension to a jurisdictionally quirky outpost, with no tangible benefit to 
anyone.”122 It was not the rule of law: “unless by that is meant the rule of lawyers, 
who will now arguably have a greater role . . . in shaping policy for alien enemy 
combatants.”123 And it was not the American people: “who today lose a bit more 
control over the conduct of this Nation’s foreign policy to unelected, politically 
unaccountable judges.”124 
iii. Justice Scalia Dissents 
Justice Scalia dissented.125 He began by emphasizing the enormity of the 
Court’s holding: “[F]or the first time in our Nation’s history, the Court confers a 
constitutional right to habeas corpus on alien enemies detained abroad by our 
military forces in the course of an ongoing war.”126 He then addressed some 
 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id. at 799–800. 
 116  Id. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. at 826. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 126  Id. at 826–27. 
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potential consequences of the Court’s decision.127 Lastly, Justice Scalia 
suggested that the judiciary—“the branch that knows least about the national 
security concerns”—had wrongly usurped executive power.128 
iv. Scholarly Interpretation 
Although Boumediene did not purport to overrule any prior decisions, 
many view the decision as an overhaul of extraterritorial jurisprudence.129 In light 
of Boumediene’s rationale, many commentators have asserted that the Court’s 
“formalistic” approach to extraterritorial jurisprudence has been replaced by a 
“functional” one.130 Only time will tell whether this is so. 
 
2. Boumediene’s Implications for Constitutional Extraterritoriality 
Despite the clamor surrounding Boumediene, many courts have entirely 
disregarded the decision in cases analyzing the Constitution’s extraterritorial 
application.131 For instance, in the recent case of United States v. Loera,132 the 
Eastern District of New York relied entirely upon Verdugo-Urquidez (without a 
single reference to Boumediene) in holding that the Fourth Amendment did not 
extend its protections to a noncitizen who resided outside the United States.133 
There, Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera (“El Chapo”) challenged the 
FBI’s search of servers that ran his encrypted communication network—which 
included phone calls, text messages, and other digital information.134 Crucially, 
these servers were in the Netherlands.135 
 
 127  Id. at 827 (“Contrary to my usual practice . . . I think it appropriate to begin with a 
description of the disastrous consequences of what the Court has done today.”). 
 128  Id. at 831. 
 129  See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2008–09 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.” 
(citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764)); Nicholson, supra note 96. 
 130  See, e.g., Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2008–09 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Joseph C. Alfe, 
Extraterritorial Constitutionalism: A Rule Proposed, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 787, 796 (2017). 
 131  See, e.g., Castro v. Cabrera, 742 F.3d 595, 599–602 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that “[b]ecause 
the Fourth Amendment does not apply to those detainees that are aliens, and [the defendant] is 
entitled to qualified immunity in relation to those detainees that are U.S. citizens, the judgment of 
dismissal is AFFIRMED”) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment “does not apply to the search 
and seizure of nonresident aliens on foreign soil”). 
 132  333 F. Supp. 3d 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 133  Id. at 181–82. 
 134  Id. at 180. 
 135  Id. 
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The FBI obtained evidence from El Chapo’s servers in three ways.136 
First, the FBI made several requests for Dutch authorities to surveil certain IP 
addresses connected to El Chapo’s communication network, while the Dutch 
authorities intercepted and recorded phone calls and provided that surveillance 
to the FBI on an ongoing basis.137 Second, the Dutch authorities executed search 
warrants on the servers and provided their contents to the FBI.138 Third, the Dutch 
authorities used additional servers to track conversations and created a backup 
server that automatically received and stored the data for the FBI.139 
El Chapo maintained that this conduct violated his Fourth Amendment 
privacy interest in the servers’ contents.140 To support this contention, El Chapo 
argued that he developed sufficient ties with the United States to acquire Fourth 
Amendment protection because—if the government’s allegations were true—he 
directed a large-scale narcotic trafficking operation within the United States.141 
Relying on Verdugo-Urquidez, the Eastern District held that “the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply ‘to the search and seizure by United States agents of 
property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign 
country.’”142 And the court noted the Second Circuit’s strict adherence to the 
holding of Verdugo-Urquidez.143 As the court put it, “this Circuit consider[s] the 
Verdugo-Urquidez holding ‘dispositive case law.’”144 
Accordingly, El Chapo could only invoke the Fourth Amendment by 
establishing substantial and voluntary connections to the United States.145 Here, 
the searches occurred in the Netherlands. And El Chapo was a citizen of Mexico 
who resided abroad. Therefore, El Chapo’s connections proved inadequate.146  
The court added that criminal conduct—however substantial it may be—
cannot yield the type of connection Verdugo-Urquidez envisioned.147 As such, 
El Chapo’s purely criminal connections to the United States did not entitle him 
 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. at 182. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. at 181. 
 143  Id. (citing In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 174 (2d Cir. 
2008); United States v. Gasperini, No. 16-CR-441, 2017 WL 3038227, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 
2017), aff’d, 894 F.3d 482 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Hasbajrami, No. 11-CR-623, 2016 WL 
1029500, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016); United States v. Defreitas, 701 F. Supp. 2d 297, 304 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 144  Id. (quoting Defreitas, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 304). 
 145  Id. at 182. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id. 
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to Fourth Amendment rights.148 In succinctly summarizing its opinion, the court 
stated the following: 
Because [the] defendant was, at the relevant time, a citizen and 
resident of Mexico and has not shown substantial voluntary 
connections to the United States, [the] defendant cannot invoke 
the Fourth Amendment for searches that occurred in the 
Netherlands. However, assuming defendant could invoke the 
Fourth Amendment, [the court] would still deny his motion to 
suppress the Dutch servers evidence.149 
Loera is by no means an aberration. Many other courts have noted that 
“the Boumediene court was concerned only with the Suspension Clause and not 
with . . . any other constitutional text.”150 For example, in Ali v. Rumsfeld,151 the 
D.C. Circuit recognized that “Boumediene ‘explicitly confined its constitutional 
holding “only” to the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause’ and 
‘disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law governing the extraterritorial 
reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the Suspension Clause.’”152 
And long “[a]fter Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit maintained that habeas only 
protected the fact, place, or duration of detention, and it expressly refused to 
apply due process to extraterritorial habeas challenges.”153 
In sum, decisions disregarding and distinguishing Boumediene suggest 
that its impact is not nearly as profound as some might believe. It would seem 
that “[t]he post-Boumediene momentum for the extraterritorial application of 
constitutional rights in favor of noncitizens has largely dissipated.”154 
C. Reconciling the Traditional and the Contemporary 
Due to the confusion surrounding constitutional extraterritoriality, some 
courts have attempted to synthesize the Traditional and Contemporary into one 
 
 148  Id. (citing United States v. Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *3 (W.D. 
Wash. May 23, 2001)). 
 149  Id. 
 150  Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 600 (1st Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
 151  649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 152  Id. at 771. 
 153  Mary Van Houten, The Post-Boumediene Paradox: Habeas Corpus or Due Process?, 67 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9 (2014) (footnote omitted); see also Al-Hela v. Trump, No. 05-cv-01048, 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42717, at *27 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2019) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit has confirmed 
that . . . detainees at Guantanamo do not possess constitutional due process rights.”). 
 154  Lee Kovarsky, Citizenship, National Security Detention, and the Habeas Remedy, 107 
CALIF. L. REV. 867, 868 (2019). It should be noted that “Justice Anthony Kennedy, who penned 
Boumediene, was replaced by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, whose decision making on the D.C. Circuit 
rejected, virtually without exception, the rights-bearing status of noncitizens abroad.” Id. 
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coherent framework.155 For illustrative purposes, consider a recent case out of 
the Third Circuit: Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney General United States.156 There, 
the court invalidated an Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)         
jurisdiction-stripping provision157 under Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene.158 
To understand Osorio-Martinez’s holding, the reader must first become 
acquainted with “entry fiction.”159 Under this doctrine, “excludable aliens . . . 
denied entry into the United States, even when technically within U.S. territory, 
may be ‘treated, for constitutional purposes, as if stopped at the border.’”160 
Without further ado, here is the full story behind Osorio-Martinez. 
In 2015, United States authorities “encountered and apprehended each 
petitioner within close proximity to the border and shortly after their illegal 
crossing.”161 At the time, the petitioners neither presented immigration papers 
nor claimed to have been lawfully admitted to the United States.162 Therefore, 
the authorities detained the petitioners and initiated removal proceedings.163 
While awaiting removal in detention, the Osorio-Martinez petitioners 
attained Special Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”) status.164 And given their changed 
statuses, the petitioners sought to secure their releases under the Suspension 
Clause. 165 
The petitioner’s action raised a novel question of first impression: “Does 
the [INA’s] jurisdiction-stripping provision . . . unconstitutional[ly] suspen[d] 
. . . the writ of habeas corpus as applied to SIJ designees seeking judicial review 
of orders of expedited removal?”166 Using Boumediene and Verdugo-Urquidez, 
the Third Circuit answered that question affirmatively.167 
 
 155  See, e.g., Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 
2019); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2012) (allowing a Malaysian 
student who was studying in the United States to bring suit for alleged First and Fifth Amendment 
violations that took place while she was traveling to Malaysia) (“Under Boumediene and Verdugo-
Urquidez, we hold that Ibrahim has ‘significant voluntary connection’ with the United States.”). 
 156  893 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 157  8 U.S.C.A § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2019). 
 158  Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 178. 
 159  Entry-fiction doctrine plays an important role in analyzing the kind of Suspension Clause 
challenge at issue in this case. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 443 n.22 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
 160  Castro v. Cabrera, 742 F.3d 595, 599–600 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 
U.S. 678, 693 (2001)). 
 161  Castro, 835 F.3d at 427 (describing the apprehension of the petitioners in Osorio-Martinez). 
 162  Id. at 427–28. 
 163  Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 159. 
 164  Id. at 160. 
 165  Id. 
 166  Id. at 158. 
 167  Id. at 168. 
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First, the court endeavored to determine whether the petitioners were 
prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause.168 Despite being noncitizens, 
the petitioners were not prohibited from doing so.169 In the Third Circuit’s view, 
the petitioners “developed the [requisite] ‘substantial connections with this 
country.’”170 The court provided four reasons in support of this contention: 
(1) [the petitioners] . . . satisfied rigorous eligibility criteria for 
SIJ status, [which made] them . . . wards of the state with 
obvious implications for their relationship to the United States; 
(2) Congress accorded [SIJ designees] a range of statutory and 
procedural protections that establish a substantial legal 
relationship with the United States; (3) . . . [the petitioners had] 
“beg[un] to develop the ties that go with permanent residence”; 
and (4) . . . [the] recognition of SIJ designees’ connection to the 
United States is consistent with the exercise of Congress’s 
plenary power.171 
Second, the court “turn[ed] to the question whether the substitute for 
habeas [was] adequate and effective to test the legality of the petitioner’s 
detention (or removal).”172 The court concluded that the INA “does not provide 
‘an “adequate [or] effective” alternative to habeas review.’”173 Accordingly, the 
court found that the petitioners’ SIJ status conferred a special right to invoke the 
Suspension Clause.174 
Although Osorio-Martinez ostensibly draws from Verdugo-Urquidez 
and Boumediene, the latter case’s function is superfluous. Instead of attempting 
to reconcile competing law, the Third Circuit could have reached the same result 
under Verdugo-Urquidez alone.175 While the Third Circuit admirably 
synthesized inconsistent doctrine, this framework’s adoption would inevitably 
foster greater confusion.176 
 
 168  Id. at 166. 
 169  Id. at 167–68. 
 170  Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)). 
 171  Id. (quoting Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 448 (3d Cir. 2016)). 
 172  Id. at 166. 
 173  Id. at 177 (quoting Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 549 F.3d 235, 246 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 174  Id. at 178. 
 175  See infra Section IV.B. 
 176  Id. 
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III. THE PRESENT DILEMMA 
As discussed above, courts are conflicted about the Constitution’s 
application to noncitizens in extraterritorial disputes. Below, this Part addresses 
the conflict’s newest developments. 
In Hernandez,177 the Fifth Circuit held that a noncitizen who lacked 
substantial ties to the United States could not use Bivens to vindicate purported 
Fourth Amendment protections.178 Soon after, the Ninth Circuit reached the 
opposite conclusion in Rodriguez.179 From these cases, a legal paradox arises: 
“[A]n alien injured on Mexican soil by a Border Patrol agent shooting from 
Texas lacks recourse . . . [whereas] an alien injured on Mexican soil by an agent 
shooting from California or Arizona may sue for damages.”180 
This Part examines the Hernandez–Rodriguez paradox. Section III.A 
discusses the development of Bivens actions. Second, Section III.B explains how 
Bivens actions led to a circuit split over constitutional extraterritoriality. Section 
III.C relays the factual background, procedural history, and legal reasoning of 
Hernandez v. Mesa. And Section III.D provides the factual background, 
procedural history, and legal reasoning of the decision that caused the present 
dilemma: Rodriguez v. Swartz. 
A. On Bivens Actions 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics,181 the Supreme Court held that federal agents who violate the Fourth 
Amendment can be held liable for money damages by way of implied cause of 
action.182 After Bivens, a number of subsequent decisions modified its breadth. 
In Davis v. Passman,183 the Court extended Bivens to allow for causes of 
action under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.184 Next, Carlson v. 
Green185 further extended Bivens to encompass Eighth Amendment disputes.186 
But this trend of expansion was short-lived. 
 
 177  885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 178  Id. at 814. 
 179  Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 180  Id. at 758 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 181  403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 182  Id. at 397. 
 183  442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 184  Id. at 248–49. 
 185  446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 186  Id. at 23. 
21
Beutell: Hard Cases Make Bad Law: Extraterritorial Application of the Unit
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
608 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122 
 
After Davis and Carlson, the Supreme Court decided eight consecutive 
cases holding Bivens actions untenable.187 This trend of rejecting Bivens claims 
ultimately culminated in Ziglar v. Abbasi,188 where the Court “made clear that 
expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”189 
In Abbasi, several noncitizens who had been detained following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks—because they lacked legal authorization to be in 
the country—brought a putative class action suit alleging due process and equal 
protection violations under Bivens.190 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy,191 the 
Court presented the analytical framework for assessing the viability of a Bivens 
action before dismissing virtually all of the respondents’ claims.192 Abbasi set 
forth the following two-pronged analysis for determining whether an ostensible 
Bivens action may proceed. 
First, courts must ask whether the case presents a “new context.”193 A 
case presents a new context if it differs from Bivens, Davis, or Carlson in a 
“meaningful way.”194 A case differs meaningfully if (1) it implicates a different 
constitutional right than previous Bivens cases; (2) it involves circumstances 
where precedent provides no substantial guide for official conduct; or (3) it 
introduces “special factors” unconsidered by previous Bivens cases.195 If a case 
 
 187  See Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (2012) (finding that a prisoner could not assert an 
Eighth Amendment Bivens action for damages against private-prison employees); Wilkie v. 
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (declining to devise a Bivens remedy that would separate 
constitutional violations from improper government actions); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 
U.S. 61 (2001) (declining to entertain a Bivens action against private entities that engaged in 
alleged constitutional malfeasance while acting under color of federal law); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471 (1994) (declining to permit a Bivens claim against a federal agency that was otherwise 
amenable to suit); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (declining to permit a Bivens action 
against individual government employees who allegedly violated due-process rights by 
mishandling Social Security applications); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (declining 
to permit a Bivens action for injuries arising out of military service); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 
(1983) (declining to permit a Bivens action against individual government officials for First 
Amendment violations that arose in federal-employment context); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 
296 (1983) (declining to provide a Bivens remedy for enlisted military personnel against their 
superior officers). 
 188  137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 189  Id. at 1857 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). 
 190  See id. at 1851–54, 1858–59. 
 191  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch took no part in this decision. 
 192  Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861–69. The Court remanded the “prisoner abuse claim . . . to allow 
the Court of Appeals to consider the claim in light of the [proper] Bivens analysis.” Id. at 1869. 
 193  Id. at 1864. 
 194  Id. at 1859. 
 195  Id. at 1864. Elsewhere, the Court provides a longer (albeit non-exhaustive) list of factors: 
the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality 
or specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how 
an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the 
22
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does not differ from prior decisions in a “meaningful way”—based upon these  
factors—it presents a cognizable Bivens claim. 
Second, when cases present new contexts, courts determine whether 
special factors caution against extending Bivens.196 While “special factors” is not 
a well-defined term,197 the Court has stated unambiguously that special-factors 
analyses answer this question: “‘[W]ho should decide’ whether to provide for a 
damages remedy, Congress or the courts?”198 
To a large extent, this question is farcical: Its answer is a forgone 
conclusion. The Court has stated unequivocally that “the Legislature is in the 
better position to consider if ‘the public interest would be served’ by imposing a 
‘new substantive legal liability.’”199 Still, courts inquire whether the judiciary is 
well suited—absent congressional action or instruction—to consider and weigh 
the costs and benefits of allowing a Bivens action to proceed.200 If a court believes 
that Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a Bivens claim, it should 
dismiss the case out of respect for the legislature.201 But if a court concludes that 
special factors do not caution against extending Bivens, the case may proceed.202 
B. Post-Abbasi Bivens Actions Beget Extraterritorial Uncertainty 
Two recent decisions are illustrative of Bivens jurisprudence in the     
post-Abbasi landscape.203 Both of the cases are factually indistinguishable: They 
involved tragic cross-border incidents in which Border Patrol agents (within the 
United States) shot and killed Mexican nationals (standing on Mexican soil).204 
Both posed the same question: Under Bivens,205 may noncitizens who lack any 
 
statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk 
of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; 
or the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not 
consider. 
Id. at 1860. 
 196  Id. at 1857. 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983)). 
 199  Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 426–27 (1988)). 
 200  Id. at 1857–58. 
 201  Id. at 1858. 
 202  Id. 
 203  Compare Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018), with Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 
F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 204  Herndandez, 885 F.3d at 814; Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 727. 
 205  403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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substantial ties to the United States recover for extraterritorial harms?206 And 
both reached opposite conclusions.207 
Indeed, Hernandez concluded with a resounding and emphatic no.208 
Relying on Abbasi, the Fifth Circuit held that expanding the Bivens action is 
judicially disfavored; therefore, it refused to provide a remedy where Congress 
had not.209 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit ruminated on the lack of “direct 
judicial guidance concerning the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution and its 
potential application to foreign citizens on foreign soil.”210 
But Rodriguez answered that same question affirmatively.211 There, the 
Ninth Circuit explicitly held that a noncitizen was entitled to extraterritorial 
Fourth Amendment protection.212 Consequently, Bivens provides an avenue for 
noncitizens—who lack any substantial ties to the United States—to recover for 
alleged extraterritorial Fourth Amendment violations.213 
Below, this Part explores these respective cases in greater detail.214 
C. Hernandez v. Mesa 
On the evening of June 7, 2010, Sergio Hernández—a 15-year-old 
Mexican citizen with no ties to the United States—was playing with his friends 
on the Mexican side of a culvert that marks the boundary between Ciudad Juarez, 
Mexico, and El Paso, Texas.215 Meanwhile, Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr., 
was engaged in his assigned law enforcement duties at the border.216 During this 
time, a group of young men began throwing rocks at Agent Mesa from the 
Mexican side of the border.217 While standing on United States soil, Agent Mesa 
 
 206  See Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 822; Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 747. 
 207  Compare Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823, with Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730. 
 208  Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823. 
 209  Id. at 811. 
 210  Id. at 817. 
 211  Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730. 
 212  Id.  
 213  Id. at 726. 
 214  See infra Section III.C (discussing Hernandez, 885 F.3d 811); Section III.D (discussing 
Rodriguez, 899 F.3d 719). 
 215  Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 814; Hernandez v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (W.D. 
Tex. 2011), aff’d, 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 
2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). 
 216  Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 814. 
 217  Id. 
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fired several shots toward his perceived assailants.218 As a result, Sergio 
Hernández was fatally wounded.219 
Afterwards, an investigation revealed that the shooting “occurred while 
smugglers attempting an illegal border crossing hurled rocks from close range at 
a Customs and Border Patrol agent who was attempting to detain a suspect.”220 
Based on these findings, investigators concluded that “the agent did not 
act inconsistently with Customs and Border Patrol policy or training regarding 
use of force.”221 Thus, the evidence did not show that Agent Mesa “acted 
willfully . . . to do something the law forbids.”222 Still, expressing remorse over 
the loss of life, officials pledged to work alongside the Mexican government in 
hopes of preventing future incidents.223 
1. The Hernándezes’ Bivens Action 
Hernández’s parents sued in the Western District of Texas.224 They 
alleged that Agent Mesa violated their son’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights 
and sought damages under Bivens.225 
Agent Mesa invoked qualified immunity and moved to dismiss.226 He 
maintained that Hernández lacked Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections 
because he was a noncitizen who lacked substantial ties to the United States.227 
The district court agreed and dismissed the case.228 The Hernándezes appealed. 
 
 218  Id. 
 219  Id. 
 220  Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017) (alterations omitted) (quoting Press 
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Federal Officials Close Investigation into the Death of Sergio 
Hernandez-Guereca (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-close-
investigation-death-sergio-hernandez-guereca). 
 221  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Federal Officials Close 
Investigation into the Death of Sergio Hernandez-Guereca (Apr. 27, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-close-investigation-death-sergio-hernandez-
guereca). 
 222  Id. (quoting Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Federal Officials Close Investigation into the 
Death of Sergio Hernandez-Guereca (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-
officials-close-investigation-death-sergio-hernandez-guereca). 
 223  Id. 
 224  Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 254 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 785 
F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 
(2017). 
 225  Id. at 255. 
 226  Id. at 256. 
 227  Id. 
 228  Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit granted the appeal. Initially, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
the judgment concerning the Fourth Amendment229 but found the Hernándezes’ 
Fifth Amendment claim viable.230 
Notwithstanding this decision, the Fifth Circuit reheard the case while 
sitting en banc and unanimously reached a twofold conclusion: (1) the Fourth 
Amendment claim failed on the merits; and (2) qualified immunity shielded 
Agent Mesa from Fifth Amendment claims.231 The Hernándezes petitioned for 
certiorari. 
2. The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard Hernandez alongside 
Abbasi.232 The Court began by addressing the Bivens question.233 In its view, the 
appropriate course of action was to allow the Fifth Circuit to undertake a new 
Bivens analysis on remand in light of its decision in Abbasi.234 (There, the Court 
had clarified the analysis that courts should undertake when addressing Bivens 
claims.235) The Court believed that “[i]t would be imprudent . . . to resolve [the 
Fourth Amendment] issue when, in light of the intervening guidance provided in 
Abbasi, doing so may be unnecessary to resolve this particular case.”236 With 
that, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the 
case for further consideration under Abbasi.237 
i. Justice Thomas Dissents 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas pointed out that the Court had 
“directed the parties to address . . . ‘[w]hether the claim in this case may be 
asserted under Bivens.’”238 Justice Thomas believed that the Court should have 
answered the question rather than remanding for the Fifth Circuit to do so.239 
Justice Thomas further noted that “‘Bivens and its progeny’ should be 
limited ‘to the precise circumstances that they involved.’”240 He saw the facts of 
 
 229  Id. at 267. 
 230  Id. at 272. 
 231  Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 232  Id. at 814–15. 
 233  Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017). 
 234  Id. at 2006–07. 
 235  See supra Section III.A. 
 236  Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007. 
 237  Id. at 2008. 
 238  Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 291, 291 (2016)). 
 239  Id. 
 240  Id. (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
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this case as meaningfully different than those of Bivens and its progeny.241 
Simply put, this case involved cross-border conduct—and the others did not.242 
Therefore, Justice Thomas would have affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision.243 
ii. Justice Breyer Dissents 
In another dissenting opinion,244 Justice Breyer—who was joined by 
Justice Ginsburg—stated that the Court should have reversed “the Court of 
Appeals’ Fourth Amendment holding.”245 Although Hernández was on the 
Mexican side of the culvert when he was shot, Justice Breyer believed that 
“questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, 
not formalism.”246 
Justice Breyer felt that Hernández was entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection. He provided six factors to support his contention: (1) the agent could 
not have known whether Sergio Hernández was a United States citizen; (2) the 
culvert—where the shooting occurred—does not contain any physical features 
of a border (e.g., fences); (3) the culvert constitutes a “limitrophe” area under 
international law; (4) the culvert was overseen by an international boundary 
commission; (5) the oversight of “limitrophe” areas imposes duties and 
obligations under international law; and (6) the Court’s failure to apply the 
Fourth Amendment to the culvert would produce serious anomalies.247 
These six considerations, according to Justice Breyer, provided ample 
reason “for treating the entire culvert as having sufficient involvement with, and 
connection to, the United States to subject [it] to Fourth Amendment 
protections.”248 After answering the Fourth Amendment question, Justice Breyer 
would have remanded for consideration of the Bivens and qualified immunity 
questions.249 
3. The Fifth Circuit’s Final Ruling on the Remanded Bivens Claim 
On remand, the Fifth Circuit—sitting en banc—reaffirmed dismissal.250 
The court held that Hernández’s Bivens claim presented a “new context” under 
 
 241  Id. 
 242  Id. 
 243  Id. 
 244  Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 245  Id. 
 246  Id. at 2008–09 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008)). 
 247  Id. at 2009–11. 
 248  Id. at 2011. 
 249  Id. 
 250  Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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Abbasi (i.e., the cross-border shooting was factually distinguishable from the 
circumstances underlying prior Bivens actions).251 In so holding, the court noted 
that binding precedent “strongly suggests that the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply to American officers’ actions outside [the] country’s borders.”252 Thus, the 
Fifth Circuit “conclude[d] that this [was] not a close case.”253 
D. Rodriguez v. Swartz 
Oftentimes, a Bivens cure worsens what it seeks to remedy.254 Rodriguez 
demonstrates as much: (1) It ignores binding precedent; (2) it distinguishes the 
indistinguishable; and (3) it undoes the first semblance of consistency that 
constitutional extraterritoriality had known since Verdugo-Urquidez.255 
In Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit held that a noncitizen residing abroad 
had Fourth Amendment protection.256 While the court acknowledged Hernandez, 
it sidestepped the case by claiming that the border patrol agent’s subjective 
knowledge about the decedent outweighed the objective facts.257 The full story 
follows.258 
1. Rodriguez’s Factual Background 
On October 10, 2012—just before midnight—Officer John Zuñiga of the 
Nogales Police Department received a call reporting suspicious activity on 
International Street, which runs along the Mexican border.259 Soon after, Officer 
Quinardo Garcia arrived on the scene and saw two men with large bundles on 
their backs climbing over the border fence into the United States.260 Officer 
Garcia immediately called for backup and began chasing the two men.261 
 
 251  Id. at 816–17. 
 252  Id. at 817 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990)). 
 253  Id. at 823. 
 254  Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561 (2007). 
 255  See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 256  Id. at 730. 
 257  Id. at 733. 
 258  Although the Ninth Circuit—as a procedural matter—relied solely on the allegations in the 
complaint, this Note provides additional information for the reader’s benefit. 
 259  Mark Binelli, 10 Shots Across the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/magazine/10-shots-across-the-
border.html?searchResultPosition=1. Although border security is the responsibility of the United 
States Border Patrol, Nogales police may intervene “when illegal activity is happening stateside—
if, for instance, drug smugglers have slipped over the fence and are making their way into Arizona.” 
Id. 
 260  Id. 
 261  Id. 
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As he pursued the men, they disappeared into a residential yard.262 
Concerned of a potential ambush, Officer Garcia decided to wait for backup.263 
Moments later, Officer Zuñiga arrived on the scene alongside several Border 
Patrol agents264—one of whom was Agent Lonnie Swartz.265 
Upon arrival, Zuñiga spotted the two men scaling the fence back into 
Mexico.266 He ordered them to climb down from the fence.267 Suddenly, Officer 
Zuñiga saw rocks flying towards him.268 He also heard gunfire.269 
Agent Swartz had fired his weapon.270 Ten bullets hit José Antonio Elena 
Rodriguez (“J.A.”).271 J.A. was a Mexican citizen who had never set foot in the 
United States.272 But Agent Swartz did not know that when he fired his 
weapon.273 
2. Araceli Rodriguez Files Suit Under Bivens 
J.A.’s mother, Araceli Rodriguez, brought a Bivens action against Agent 
Swartz in Arizona’s district court.274 She asserted that Agent Swartz intentionally 
killed J.A. and thereby violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.275 
Agent Swartz moved to dismiss.276 The motion set forth two separate 
arguments for dismissal: (1) J.A. was not entitled to constitutional protections 
because he was a noncitizen who lacked substantial ties to the United States; and 
(2) Agent Swartz was entitled to qualified immunity.277 
 
 262  Id. 
 263  Id. 
 264  Id. 
 265  Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 266  Binelli, supra note 259. 
 267  Id. 
 268  Id. 
 269  Id. 
 270  Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 727. 
 271  Binelli, supra note 259. 
 272  Jacob Gershman, Border Patrol Shooting of Mexican Teen Civil Lawsuit Goes to Court, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2016, 5:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/border-patrol-shooting-of-
mexican-teen-civil-lawsuit-goes-to-court-1476989995?ns=prod/accounts-wsj. 
 273  Binelli, supra note 259. 
 274  Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030 (D. Ariz. 2015), aff’d, 899 F.3d 719 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
 275  See id. 
 276  Id. 
 277  Id. at 1030–31. 
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The district court denied Agent Swartz’s motion.278 The court took this 
as an opportunity to highlight its disagreement with Hernandez.279 It found that 
Agent Swartz violated J.A.’s clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights.280 
Consequently, Agent Swartz could not rely on qualified immunity.281 In turn, 
Agent Swartz filed an interlocutory appeal. 
3. The Ninth Circuit Finds in Araceli Rodriguez’s Favor 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision.282 The 
court found that J.A. “had a Fourth Amendment right to be free from the . . . 
unreasonable use of deadly force.”283 Much like the district court below, the 
Ninth Circuit “recognize[d] that on similar facts, the Fifth Circuit reached a 
contrary conclusion.”284 Nevertheless, the court distinguished Rodriguez from 
Hernandez.285 And the court held that—assuming the allegations were true—
Swartz was not entitled to qualified immunity.286 
“[T]his case is not about searches and seizures broadly speaking,” wrote 
the Ninth Circuit: “It is about the unreasonable use of deadly force by a federal 
agent on American soil.”287 Therefore, the court concluded that the use of 
“deadly force by an American agent acting on American soil,”288 regardless of 
the decedent’s location, was subject to the Fourth Amendment.289 
Although the court expressed some reluctance in extending Bivens,290 it 
chose to do so for three reasons: (1) Rodriguez lacked alternative remedies;291 
(2) Congress did not withhold remedies deliberately;292 and (3) special factors 
 
 278  Id. at 1028. 
 279  Id. at 1041. (“This holding again contravenes that of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117 (2015). This Court respectfully disagrees with the en 
banc panel’s decision that ‘any properly asserted right was not clearly established to the extent the 
law requires.’” (quoting Hernandez, 785 F.3d 117)). 
 280  Id. at 1039. 
 281  Id. 
 282  Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 748 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 283  Id. at 731. 
 284  Id. 
 285  Id. 
 286  Id. at 748. 
 287  Id. at 731. 
 288  Id. 
 289  Id. 
 290  See id. at 744. 
 291  Id. at 739. 
 292  Id. 
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did not counsel hesitation.293 In so holding, the court noted that the allegations 
may turn out to be unsupported and the shooting may have been justified.294 
“[M]indful of the tragedy underlying this case,”295 Circuit Judge Milan 
D. Smith, Jr., issued a blistering dissent.296 In his view, Hernandez should have 
determined the outcome of this case.297 “By creating an extraterritorial Bivens 
remedy,” Judge Smith contended, “the majority veers into uncharted territory, 
ignores Supreme Court law, and upsets the separation of powers between the 
judiciary and the political branches of government.”298 Worse still, the majority 
did not properly apply the principles set forth in Abbasi.299 And this led to the 
unfounded conclusion “that there [were] no special factors weighing against this 
unprecedented expansion of Bivens.”300 
Finally, Judge Smith expressed concern about the implications and 
externalities of the court’s decision.301 He framed the untenable result this way: 
“[A]n alien injured on Mexican soil by a Border Patrol agent shooting from 
Texas lacks recourse under Bivens, [while] an alien injured on Mexican soil by 
an agent shooting from California or Arizona may sue for damages.”302  
IV. HARD CASES MAKE BAD LAW 
Below, this Part aims to resolve the Hernandez–Rodriguez circuit split. 
Section IV.A contends that the Hernandez–Rodriguez split’s constitutional 
implications make it unsustainable.303 Section IV.B explains why the Supreme 
Court must resolve the split by demarcating the Constitution’s extraterritorial 
limitations.304 And Section IV.C posits that the legislature—not the judiciary—
is best suited to establish remedies for cross-border shootings.305 
 
 293  Id. at 746–47. 
 294  Id. at 748. 
 295  Id. at 757 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 296  Id. at 748. 
 297  Id. at 750. 
 298  Id. at 758. 
 299  Id. 
 300  Id. 
 301  Id. 
 302  Id. 
 303  See infra Section IV.A. 
 304  See infra Section IV.B. 
 305  See infra Section IV.C. 
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A. The Hernandez–Rodriguez Circuit Split Is Unsustainable 
Cliché or not, hard cases make bad law.306 Rodriguez is undoubtedly a 
hard case. So it is unsurprising that reason finds no refuge in its jurisprudence of 
confusion.307 From Rodriguez, a legal paradox arose: “[A]n alien injured on 
Mexican soil by a Border Patrol agent shooting from Texas lacks recourse under 
Bivens, [whereas] an alien injured on Mexican soil by an agent shooting from 
California or Arizona may sue for damages.”308 
To be sure, all circuit splits make outcomes contingent upon forum.309 
But the Hernandez–Rodriguez split presents a far more egregious problem: 
Constitutional protections apply differently to identically situated persons. This 
is because Rodriguez shook the very foundations of American jurisprudence by 
expanding the Constitution’s reach beyond its grasp. It is one thing for circuits 
to split on matters of statutory interpretation: “Congress can clarify, amend, or 
repeal a federal statute variously interpreted by circuits . . . .”310 It is another for 
circuits to split on constitutional matters because only the Supreme Court can 
resolve the conflict definitively.311 
Before Rodriguez, no court had extended Bivens to cases involving the 
extraterritorial application of constitutional protections.312 And the “[Supreme] 
Court has rejected every Bivens claim it has evaluated . . . that touch[es] on 
national security, even while recognizing the lack of alternate remedies.”313 This 
practice stems from the Court’s desire to provide federal officers with wide 
latitude to perform their duties.314 The Court also justifies its practice on 
separation of powers grounds.315 Since the Constitution bestows the executive 
and legislative branches with plenary power over foreign relations and national 
 
 306  N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 307  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 993 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 308  Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 758 (2018) (M. Smith, J., dissenting). 
 309  For this reason, circuit splits provoke federal forum shopping. See Wayne A. Logan, 
Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
1137, 1142 (2012). 
 310  Id. 
 311  Id. 
 312  Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 424–25 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2325 (2017). 
 313  Recent Case, Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 1096, 
1101 (2019). 
 314  Id. 
 315  Id. 
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security, the Court avoids treading on that terrain.316 Despite these concerns, 
Rodriguez consciously departed from the Traditional view.317 
Rodriguez not only departs from the typical Bivens analysis but also 
disregards binding precedent on extraterritoriality. After all, the Court holds that 
the Fourth Amendment protects only “the people” of the United States;318 it does 
not “restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the 
United States territory.”319 Therefore, as explained below, “it is possible that 
Rodriguez will not withstand higher review.”320 
1. On Rodriguez’s Externalities 
At first, a malady is difficult to detect but easy to cure.321 In time, the 
malady becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure.322 Bad law is the same way. 
While Rodriguez’s implications are difficult to detect, they will be debilitating if 
left uncured.323 
Until Rodriguez, “the starting points and first principles in this debate 
[were] not seriously in dispute.”324 Even after Boumediene, “[t]he two available 
toeholds to persons who assert constitutional rights from outside the sovereign 
territory of the United States [were] American citizenship and some element of 
de facto or de jure American sovereignty over the territory of the events in 
question.”325 In situations involving neither de facto nor de jure sovereignty, 
noncitizens outside the geographic boundaries of the United States “receive[d] 
constitutional protections only ‘when they [had] come within the territory of the 
United States and developed substantial connections with this country.’”326 
Despite recent aberrations, “[t]he Supreme Court has long taken the view 
that the Constitution is subject to territorial limitations.”327 Over the years, 
federal law developed atop this stable foundation. For instance, this view is the 
 
 316  Id. 
 317  Id. 
 318  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990). 
 319  Id. 
 320  Recent Case, supra note 313, at 1101. 
 321  NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 11 (W.K. Marriott trans., Everyman’s Library 1908) 
(1532). 
 322  Id. 
 323  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Swartz v. Rodriguez (No. 18-309). 
 324  Veiga v. World Meteorological Org., 568 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 325  Id. (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008); United States v.  Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957)). 
 326  Id. (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271). 
 327  Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
33
Beutell: Hard Cases Make Bad Law: Extraterritorial Application of the Unit
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
620 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122 
 
groundwork upon which our system of immigration law rests.328 This view also 
underlies all manner of national security endeavors.329 To disregard this view—
as Rodriguez does—is to shatter the bedrock of much federal law. Consider two 
examples. 
i. Immigration Law 
“[J]udicial meddling in immigration matters is particularly violative of 
separation-of-powers principles because the Constitution gives the political 
branches ‘broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration.’”330 In the 
same vein, immigration litigation—which places “actual and often sympathetic 
human being[s] front and center”331—finds courts in a position where they tend 
to overvalue individual interests and overlook policy considerations.332 Often, 
the ramifications of interventionist decisions do not become apparent until long 
after the gavel comes down.333 For these reasons, the judiciary resists taking an 
active role in immigration.334 But extending constitutional rights to noncitizens 
abroad would require the judiciary to adopt a preeminent role. 
Immigration law distinguishes between noncitizens who are physically 
present in the United States and noncitizens who are not.335 Noncitizens in the 
United States possess certain rights and privileges that those abroad lack.336 And 
those seeking initial admission have no constitutional rights at the port of 
 
 328  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“The distinction between an alien who has 
effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration 
law.”). 
 329  See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 758 (9th Cir. 2018) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 330  Maria S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Garza, 912 F.3d 778, 784–85 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Arizona v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012)), cert. denied sub nom., Maria S. v. Garza, No. 18-1350, 
2019 WL 4921302 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019). 
 331  David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 
29, 48 (2015). 
 332  Id. 
 333  Id. 
 334  Id. 
 335  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 
 336  Id.; see, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972) (analyzing the right to 
receive information domestically because an unadmitted noncitizen could not invoke any speech 
protections while abroad). 
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entry.337 Clearly, then, extending constitutional rights to noncitizens abroad 
would compel a complete overhaul of immigration law.338 
Under such a regime, immigration law’s foundational principles would 
become untenable because they presuppose that noncitizens who reside abroad 
lack constitutional protections.339 Indeed, “Congress regularly makes rules that 
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”340 Thus, if constitutional rights 
extended to all persons and places—which dissolves any meaningful distinction 
between citizen and noncitizen—these rules would be unsustainable. 
ii. Intelligence Gathering 
If constitutional protections were extended to noncitizens abroad,        
law-enforcement organizations would need to revamp international      
intelligence-gathering policies to account for the Fourth Amendment protections 
of all persons in all places. Indeed, many of the current “United States’ . . . 
security operations could violate the Constitution if the affected noncitizens 
outside the United States had . . . constitutional rights.”341 A universal Fourth 
Amendment would not only hamper law enforcement’s ability to obtain   
national-security intel but also provide arrestees with a mechanism for appearing 
before a United States tribunal.342 No doubt, “accepting [this view] would have 
significant and deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting 
activities beyond its boundaries.” 343 
 
 337  Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“This Court has long held that an alien seeking 
initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding 
his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.”); Leng May 
Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (“[I]mmigration laws have long made a distinction 
between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within 
the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance[,] the Court has 
recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are 
merely ‘on the threshold of initial entry.’”); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598 n.5 
(1953) (“The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to 
these shores.”). 
 338  See NEUMAN, supra note 33, at 118. 
 339  This is why “[s]cholars challenging the plenary power doctrine seek to constitutionalize 
immigration law.” Travis Silva, Toward a Constitutionalized Theory of Immigration Detention, 31 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 243 (2012). 
 340  Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
 341  Kent, supra note 39, at 464. 
 342  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1990) (finding that the 
international “[a]pplication of the Fourth Amendment . . . could significantly disrupt the ability of 
the political branches to respond to foreign situations involving our national interest . . . . [And] 
aliens with no attachment to this country might well bring actions for damages to remedy claimed 
violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international waters”). 
 343  Id. at 273. 
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B. The Court Must Clarify the Constitution’s Extraterritorial Scope 
When the Supreme Court addresses the Hernandez–Rodriguez split, it 
must begin by clarifying the Constitution’s extraterritorial scope.344 This way, 
the Court effectively resolves the split without rehashing Bivens issues directly. 
The rationale is simple enough: Either Fourth Amendment protections extend to 
noncitizens abroad or they do not. And if they do not—as precedent holds—
Rodriguez becomes unsustainable because Bivens only provides remedies for 
constitutional violations.345 
By focusing on constitutional extraterritoriality—and setting out a clear 
principle of decision—the Court removes a stain of uncertainty from the law. 
This approach not only resolves the present split but also prevents any future 
splits from arising. Prudential considerations aside, the prevailing uncertainty is 
incompatible with the rule of law.346 The longer that this uncertainty lingers, the 
more harm that befalls the rule of law.347 
Below, this Part moves from generalities to specifics in arguing that the 
Constitution has no extraterritorial application whatsoever to noncitizens who 
reside abroad. 
1. Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? 
As Professor Andrew Kent has discussed at length, many aspects of the 
Constitution suggest that it is not a universal document.348 While this Note does 
not presume to rewrite Professor Kent’s work, some of his observations appear 
below. Before that, however, the most glaring feature of the Constitution merits 
discussion: It is a constitution. 
 
 344  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Swartz v. Rodriguez, No. 18-309, 2018 WL 4348517 
(U.S. Sept. 7, 2018) (asking whether “the panel’s decision to create [a Bivens] remedy . . . in the 
new context of a cross-border shooting, misapplies Supreme Court precedent and violates 
separation-of-powers principles, where foreign relations, border security, and the extraterritorial 
application of the Fourth Amendment are some of the special factors that counsel hesitation against 
such an extension”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 17-1678, 2018 
WL 3155839 (U.S. June 15, 2018) (asking whether the “plaintiffs plausibly allege that a rogue 
federal law enforcement officer violated clearly established Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights 
for which there is no alternative legal remedy”). 
 345  Bivens established an “implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to 
have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 
(2001). 
 346  Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989). 
 347  See id. 
 348  Kent, supra note 39, at 485 (“Viewed as a whole, the Constitution is not a globalist 
document.”). 
36
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss2/9
2019] HARD CASES MAKE BAD LAW 623 
 
i. Never Forget that We Are Expounding a Constitution 
Famously, in McCulloch v. Maryland,349 Chief Justice John Marshall 
wrote that “we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”350 
(The expounders forgot.) Merriam-Webster defines the term constitution as “the 
basic principles and laws of a nation, state, or social group that determine the 
powers and duties of the government and guarantee certain rights to the people 
in it.”351 By definition, then, a constitution governs a particular group and confers 
rights only to those within the group. And for most of United States history, 
courts took this for granted. 
For instance, the reader will remember Chisholm v. Georgia.352 There, 
Chief Justice John Jay remarked that “the Constitution of the United States is . . . 
a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves . . . in a 
certain manner.”353 He analogized to then-existing state constitutions.354 These 
founding-era state constitutions shared an important feature: They focused on the 
rights of their respective political communities.355 Consider a primary objective 
of the Massachusetts Constitution: “to secure the existence of the body-politic, 
to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who compose it with the power of 
enjoying, in safety and tranquility, their natural rights and blessings of life.”356 
Thus, the Massachusetts Constitution did not establish a government for all; it 
created one for “ourselves and posterity.”357 Likewise, as Chief Justice John Jay 
observed, the United States Constitution established a government for the people 
and their posterity. 
 
 349  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 350  Id. at 407. 
 351  Constitution, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/constitution (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines the term constitution as “[t]he fundamental and organic law of a country or state that 
establishes the institutions and apparatus of government, defines the scope of governmental 
sovereign powers, and guarantees individual civil rights and civil liberties; a set of basic laws and 
principles that a country, state, or organization is governed by.” Constitution, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 352  2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
 353  Id. at 471 (emphasis added). 
 354  Id. (“Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to 
govern themselves in a certain manner . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 355  Kent, supra note 39, at 489. 
 356  MASS. CONST. of 1780, pmbl. 
 357  Id. 
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ii. The Law of the Land 
As another matter, consider the Supremacy Clause.358 It provides that the 
“Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land,”359 not the law of any 
other place.360 And in 18th century usage, the “law of the land” referred to 
domestic law—often common law—which stood in stark contrast with the law 
of nations.361 
iii. For Ourselves and Our Posterity 
The Constitution’s Preamble also betrays its territorial orientation.362 
Examples abound. First, the Preamble explains that the Constitution is intended 
to “insure domestic Tranquility.”363 No doubt, this clause’s domestic orientation 
speaks for itself. Second, the Preamble secures “Liberty” to “ourselves and our 
Posterity”—but not to anyone else.364 And, third, the Preamble states that the 
Constitution exists to “provide for the common defence.”365 Taken in context, 
“common defence” refers to the defense of “the People of the United States” and 
the “Union”—not the defense of foreign people or foreign places.366 All 
throughout, the Preamble makes clear that the Constitution is “ordain[ed] and 
establish[ed] for the United States of America.”367 
2. Reconciling Boumediene and Verdugo-Urquidez 
Boumediene’s legacy proves as controversial as the decision itself.368 For 
years, critics felt that it went too far by extending habeas to noncitizen terrorism 
 
 358  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 359  Id. 
 360  Kent, supra note 39, at 509. 
 361  Id. at 510. 
 362  Id. 
 363  U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 364  Kent, supra note 39, at 509. 
 365  Id. 
 366  Id. 
 367  Id. 
 368  Stephen I. Vladeck, Opinion, Will the Rule of Law Apply Along the Border?, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/opinion/boumediene-rule-of-law-
border.html. 
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suspects outside the United States.369 Meanwhile, proponents argued that the 
decision did not go far enough because it extended habeas only to Guantanamo 
detainees and provided no guidance on procedural, evidentiary, or substantive 
rules.370 As such, it is obvious that neither camp is satisfied. One D.C. Circuit 
judge “went so far as to compare the justices in the majority to the characters in 
‘The Great Gatsby’—‘careless people’ who ‘smashed things up’ and ‘let other 
people clean up the mess they had made.’”371 
For now, one thing seems clear: Boumediene means different things to 
different people.372 To some, “Boumediene’s right to habeas corpus would be 
meaningless if there were no substantive rights [for it] to protect.”373 To others, 
Boumediene is meaningful only insofar as factually analogous cases arise—i.e., 
cases involving prisoners seeking habeas corpus from a detention camp.374 
Unsurprisingly, the author adopts the latter perspective. 
Recall that Boumediene involved a fundamentally different issue than 
Verdugo-Urquidez.375 In Boumediene, the issue was whether the Suspension 
Clause’s reach extended to areas where the federal government had de facto 
control.376 Verdugo-Urquidez, on the other hand, raised the issue of whether 
constitutional protections extended to a noncitizen abroad.377 
Out of context, Boumediene’s functional analysis might seem to leave 
open the possibility that substantive rights extend to noncitizens abroad.378 But 
 
 369  Id. 
 370  Id. 
 371  Id. 
 372  Compare Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(claiming that Boumediene renders the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution dependent upon a 
functional test), with Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 817 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“[N]o 
federal circuit court has extended the holding of Boumediene either substantively to other 
constitutional provisions or geographically to locales where the United States has neither de facto 
nor de jure control. Indeed, the courts have unanimously rejected such extensions.”). 
 373  Van Houten, supra note 153, at 11 (quoting former Solicitor General Neal Katyal). 
 374  See, e.g., Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 817 (“[N]o federal circuit court has extended the holding 
of Boumediene either substantively to other constitutional provisions or geographically to locales 
where the United States has neither de facto nor de jure control. Indeed, the courts have 
unanimously rejected such extensions.”); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 771 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (“Boumediene ‘explicitly confined its constitutional holding “only” to the extraterritorial 
reach of the Suspension Clause’ and ‘disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law governing 
the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the Suspension Clause.’”); 
Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 600 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The Boumediene court was concerned 
only with the Suspension Clause . . . not with . . . any other constitutional text.”). 
 375  Maltz, supra note 21, at 404–06. 
 376  Id. 
 377  Id. 
 378  Id. 
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the Boumediene Court did not purport to overrule Verdugo-Urquidez.379 And 
Verdugo-Urquidez spoke in no uncertain terms about the test for determining if 
noncitizen litigants possess constitutional protections: “[A]liens receive such 
protections when they have come within the territory of, and have developed 
substantial connections with, [the United States].” 380 
C. Clear Constitutional Boundaries Beget Sound Legislative Actions 
During oral arguments in Hernandez v. Mesa,381 Justice Kennedy asked 
whether Congress had considered passing any laws that would compensate 
victims’ families in instances of cross-border shootings.382 In response, Deputy 
Solicitor General Kneedler stated that he did not know of any such bills, “but 
that would be the solution.”383 
Two facets of this exchange are noteworthy. First, Justice Kennedy’s 
question betrays his awareness that no laws addressed the issue at hand. And 
second, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler’s response tacitly demonstrates his 
understanding that his adversary’s lack of legal authority was not dispositive of 
the matter. Both aspects of the exchange are deeply troubling in a system of 
enumerated powers384 that expressly limits the judiciary’s jurisdiction to cases 
arising under federal law.385 
1. On the Roles of Judges and Legislators 
These days, courts are either innovative or restrained. Innovative courts 
make mistakes; restrained courts prevent those mistakes from being corrected: 
“This is . . . the balance, or mutual check, in our Constitution.”386 Of course, that 
was a joke—albeit a bad one—but it rings true because innovation without 
correction caused the present dilemma. While the courts busy themselves by 
ceaselessly “caution[ing] against ‘broad pronouncements’ with respect to ‘the 
 
 379  Id. 
 380  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 260 (1990). 
 381  137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). 
 382  Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (No. 15-118). 
 383  Id. 
 384  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“The Constitution creates a Federal 
Government of enumerated powers.”). 
 385  U.S. CONST. art. III (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority.”). 
 386  G.K. Chesterton, The Blunders of Our Parties, ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS, Apr. 19, 1924, 
reprinted in 33 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF G.K. CHESTERTON 312, 313 (Lawrence J. Clipper ed., 
1990). 
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Constitution’s extraterritorial application,’”387 they simultaneously ignore more 
than a century of precedent addressing the issue. And when precedent abounds, 
judicial reluctance is mistaken. 
Having discussed innovations in constitutional extraterritoriality,388 this 
Note would be remiss not to briefly remark on the underlying motivation. Likely, 
a desire for justice has motivated courts to depart from historical norms. When a 
court references the lack of alternative remedies in a Bivens action, it is 
expressing concern that a wrong cannot be righted without judicial innovation. 
In the United States, however, courts are not arbiters of justice.389 An 
oft-mentioned anecdote illustrates the point. One day, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes and Judge Learned Hand lunched together. After finishing their meals, 
Holmes entered his carriage to return home.390 As the carriage gained speed, 
Judge Hand shouted his goodbye: “Do justice, sir, do justice.” Holmes halted the 
carriage in its tracks. “That is not my job,” Holmes replied: “It is my job to apply 
the law.”391 
Whether apocryphal or not, this story illustrates an essential truth of 
American jurisprudence. When Holmes remarked that justice would not be 
appropriate judicial consideration, he was not saying that justice has no place in 
law.392 Rather, he was saying that it is not a judge’s function to put it there.393 
Although justice undoubtedly plays an important role in the legislative process, 
it has little or no role in the judicial interpretation of legislation.394 
It might seem that if justice is desirable in law, the question of who puts 
it there is secondary (or even entirely trivial).395 Nothing could be further from 
true: Justice contrived at whim from personal predilection is not justice at all. 
The recognition of this fact underlies the American legal system—which respects 
not the rule of king but the rule of law.396 It follows that the separation of powers 
 
 387  United States v. Kashamu, 15 F. Supp. 3d 854, 859 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing United States v. 
Wanigasinghe, 545 F.3d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
 388  See supra Part II. 
 389  THOMAS SOWELL, THE QUEST FOR COSMIC JUSTICE 168–69 (1999). 
 390  Id. 
 391  Id. (emphasis added). See also STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN 
WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS 415 (2019) (“Learned Hand often told the story of how one time, visiting 
Holmes in Washington, he had jokingly called back to him as they parted after sharing a ride to 
the Capital, ‘Well, Sir, goodbye, do justice!’ Holmes spun sharply around. ‘Come here, young 
feller, come here.’ . . . ‘That is not my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules.’”). 
 392  SOWELL, supra note 389, at 168–69. 
 393  Id. 
 394  Id. 
 395  Id. 
 396  THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in COMMON SENSE AND RELATED 
WRITINGS 72, 98 (Thomas P. Slaughter ed., 2001) (“[I]n America THE LAW IS KING.”). 
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in creating and interpreting law preserves the rule of law itself.397 Without this 
separation, arbitrariness governs. (Judicial preference enshrines itself as law.) To 
guard against this, judges and legislators should embrace their respective roles. 
Prudential considerations should be left to legislators.398 And judges should “see 
that the game is played according to the rules[—]whether [they] like them or 
not.”399 
2. Judicial Activism Disincentivizes Legislative Action 
Bivens and its progeny are relics “of the heady days in which this Court 
assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them to be 
‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition.”400 
Nowadays, courts seem to know better.401 But old habits die hard.402 
When courts allow for Bivens-style remedies—as the Ninth Circuit did 
in Rodriguez—they disincentivize Congress from acting. After all, why should 
Congress address a problem that the judiciary has already addressed? The logic 
is simple: When the judiciary usurps legislative power by inventing post-hoc 
remedies, it preempts congressional action and allows legislators to abdicate 
their roles with impunity. Consequently, Congress may freely ignore problems 
that it would otherwise have to address. 
This Note does not advocate against extending constitutional rights to 
noncitizens abroad out of some perverse desire to deprive them of legal remedies 
for real-world harms; it makes the case for strict territoriality because it is an 
essential piece of the constitutional puzzle. When that piece is in place, it ensures 
that the system can function as intended. (Here, this means Congress would face 
political pressure to address the issue of cross-border shootings.) But when that 
piece is out of place—when the judiciary extends the Constitution’s reach beyond 
its grasp—Congress lacks any incentive to act. Thus, inadequate remedies, 
jurisprudential inconsistencies, and tragic externalities proliferate. 
Finally, just because “constitutional rights should not be interpreted as 
restricting all government action against all persons in all places . . . does not 
mean that . . . uses of force . . . are immune from demands for justification.”403 
Instead, “it simply means that the standards . . . are not to be sought in the United 
 
 397  SOWELL, supra note 389, at 169. 
 398  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (“When an issue ‘involves a host of 
considerations that must be weighed and appraised,’ it should be committed to ‘those who write 
the laws’ rather than ‘those who interpret them.’”). 
 399  SOWELL, supra note 389, at 169–70. 
 400  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 401  See, e.g., Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857. 
 402  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 403  NEUMAN, supra note 33, at 111. 
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States Constitution.”404 It is the legislature’s responsibility to address              
cross-border shootings. And only the legislature can do so adequately. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution’s framers were like pioneering ship builders.405 They 
did not merely seek to assemble a structure that would stay afloat in rough seas; 
they meant to grant passengers greater comfort and safety than any preceding 
ship provided.406 To this end, the framers included rights akin to lifeboats.407 
Passengers use them if the ship fails.408 
Today, however, the crew (the courts) and the passengers (the people) 
fixate on the lifeboats while the ship decays. This fixation portends disaster. 
While they lay plans to sail lifeboats around the world, the ship goes untended. 
Lest the ship sink, those aboard must remember what keeps them afloat. 
Thus, this Note contends that legal lifeboats are not intended for those 
who never set foot on the constitutional ship. As the law stands, “it is [neither] 
anomalous [n]or unprincipled to read the Constitution as protecting people within 
the United States but not aliens abroad.”409 Indeed, the Supreme Court espoused 
this view since it first addressed the issue. Until the Court reaffirms its 
Traditional jurisprudence, paradoxical decisions will continue to multiply. 
Consensus dictates that such a result is untenable: “People, regardless of their 
citizenship status, should not be subjected to on-again, off-again protections.”410 
Alas, the Hernandez–Rodriguez voyage leaves the ship aimlessly adrift in 
uncertain seas. 
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